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Abstract 
The paper examines the role of education in shaping individuals’ attitudes towards 
migration in European countries using data from the 2012, 2014 and 2016 editions of the 
European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8). Results indicate that, despite the large 
influx of migrants experienced by many European countries in 2015, attitudes towards 
migration reported by 25-65 year olds in Europe did not vary significantly over the period 
considered. Education was strongly associated with individuals’ attitudes towards 
migration although the strength of the association and how the association changed over 
time varied greatly across countries. On average a difference of one standard deviation in 
educational participation is associated with a difference of 20% of a standard deviation in 
reported opposition to migration. Around three quarters of the association between 
education and opposition to migration can be explained by the lower economic threat, 
cultural threat and prejudice that individuals with higher educational participation 
experience. Between 2014 and 2016 the overall association between education and 
attitudes towards migration became weaker in countries with an increase in foreign-born 
population, a decrease in polarisation that was accompanied by no changes in overall 
levels of opposition to migration. The presence of migrants in a country and the 
unemployment rate moderate the extent to which the association between education and 
attitudes towards migration is mediated by cultural threat but not economic threat or 
prejudice.  
 
This work has been published in parallel as an OECD Working Paper No. 185. 
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Executive summary 
● Attitudes towards migration reported by 25-65 year olds in Europe did not vary 
significantly between 2012 and 2016. 
● We find that education plays an important role in shaping attitudes towards 
migration primarily because it lowers the feelings of economic threat, cultural 
threat and prejudice that individuals perceive in response to the presence of 
foreign-born individuals.  
● In countries and periods when the unemployment rate is higher and when the 
share of foreign born individuals is higher, cultural threat is more strongly felt by 
individuals with lower educational attainment. 
 
Context of the project 
An estimated 4.9 million migrants arrived in European countries in 2015 (EUROSTAT, 
2018) and while this figure was part of a long and steady upward trend in the share of 
foreign-born populations residing in European countries, 2015 figures represented a 
sudden and sizable increase over the 4 million of arrivals registered in 2014  (EUROSTAT, 
2018). The aim of this work is to examine how European societies have responded to the 
risk to social cohesion posed by international migration and how education policies can 
support this adjustment. 
 
Empirical results 
Education was strongly associated with individuals’ attitudes towards migration although 
the strength of the association and how the association changed over time varied greatly 
across countries. Around three quarters of the association between education and 
opposition to migration can be explained by the lower economic threat, cultural threat 
and prejudice that individuals with higher educational participation experience. Between 
2014 and 2016 the overall association between education and attitudes towards 
migration became weaker in countries with an increase in foreign-born population, a 
decrease in polarisation that was accompanied by no changes in overall levels of 
opposition to migration. The presence of migrants in a country and the unemployment 
rate moderate the extent to which the association between education and attitudes 
towards migration is mediated by cultural threat but not by economic threat or prejudice.  
 
Policy implications 
The fact that individuals with greater educational attainment experience lower prejudice 
and lower cultural threat suggests that even if individuals can be open to the social and 
cultural diversity that results from migration flows, at the moment formal education is 
the primary channel that helps develop the cognitive capacity, emotional dispositions and 
psychological states that are necessary to not feel threatened by the presence of foreign-
born populations. The political and social significance of this finding cannot be 
underestimated since, unless remedied, a profound cultural gap between social classes is 
likely to emerge. It is of paramount importance that compulsory schooling equips all 
individuals with the ability to either not feel threatened by the culture of new arrivals or 
with the ability to respond positively to feelings of threat. 
Potential actions include the development of lifelong learning programs that can help 
older cohorts with the knowledge and skills that are necessary to be able to understand 
multicultural issues and deal with the tensions they create in everyday life. Second, a 
stronger focus should be put to fostering global competencies early on in the school 
years to ensure that all individuals, irrespective of their eventual highest educational 
attainment, will develop similar levels of the foundation skills that are necessary to be 
open and understand different cultures and traditions.  
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1 Introduction 
An estimated 4.9 million migrants arrived in European countries in 2015 (EUROSTAT, 
2018) and while this figure was part of a long and steady upward trend in the share of 
foreign-born populations residing in European countries, 2015 figures represented a 
sudden and sizable increase over the 4 million of arrivals registered in 2014  (EUROSTAT, 
2018). While migration flows can create difficulties for host communities, they also 
represent an opportunity for countries that face ageing native-born populations and the 
associated threat of labour and skills shortages (OECD, 2018a).  
The ability of societies to withstand the pressures on social cohesion posed by migration 
flows depends on the long-term integration of immigrants, which reflects the host 
community’s capacity to facilitate the settlement of new arrivals as well as immigrants’ 
own capacity to adapt and become part of both labour markets and social networks in 
countries of destinations (OECD, 2018a). Education is often considered an important 
element for promoting long-term integration processes because it enables immigrants to 
acquire skills that will lead them to enter the labour market, and because education 
systems can help migrants understand the culture and the traditions of their country of 
destination.  
However, education can also play an important role in shaping the attitudes native 
populations hold towards immigrants. Migration in fact requires both migrants and 
natives to undergo a process of acculturation, particularly when the size of the migrant 
group is large (Berry, 1997). The literature has identified three key mechanisms that 
drive the formation of native populations’ attitudes towards migration: competition over 
social and economic resources (e.g. Blumer 1958; Bobo 1988; Olzak 1992), threat to the 
cultural and national homogeneity of society (e.g. Castles and Miller 2003; Fetzer 2000) 
and prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Vala, Lopes and Lima, 
2008; Verberk, Scheepers and Felling, 2002). Education can importantly shape 
individuals’ perceptions of economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice and, through 
such effects shape individuals’ attitudes towards migration. However, while the 
association between education and attitudes towards migration has been studied 
extensively and studies have indicated that such association varies across countries and 
contexts (Borgonovi, 2012; d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2015), it remains unknown what 
are the primary mechanisms shaping such association and to what extent such 
association depends on migration flows, the prevalence of foreign-born individuals in a 
country and economic factors. The period covered in this paper is characterised by 
European countries having just experienced a major economic recession (2008) which 
affected different countries differently, but also and crucially, by a sudden and major 
inflows of new arrivals (in 2015 such arrivals were mostly refugees and asylum seekers 
from war-torn nations). 
In this paper we use data on countries that participated in the last three rounds of the 
European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), a large and nationally representative survey 
capturing attitudes towards migration of individuals aged 15 and above residing in 
Europe. Round 6 was implemented in 2012, well before the large inflows of refugees 
begun arriving in Europe. Round 7 was implemented in 2014, just before the migration 
crisis hit European countries. Round 8 was implemented in 2016, right after the peak in 
arrivals. We include data from 2012 as well as 2014 and 2016 to identify if any changes 
that can be observed between 2014 and 2016 reflect prior trends. Our analysis focuses 
on the nineteen countries that participated in rounds 6, 7 and 8 of the European Social 
Survey: Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
By comparing estimates on the association between education and attitudes towards 
migration in Europe in 2012, 2014 and 2016 we aim to provide evidence on the extent to 
which education can support the ability of European societies to hold positive attitudes 
towards migration at times of rapid changes in migrant populations.  
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Our contribution is fourfold: first we examine between-country differences in the 
evolution of attitudes towards migration between 2012 and 2016 in Europe. Second, we 
identify the extent to which the overall association between education and native 
populations’ attitudes towards migration changed between 2014 and 2016, using 2012 as 
a benchmark to evaluate if any changes observed between 2014 and 2016 are in line 
with existing trends or represent important departures. Third, we examine between-
country differences and changes over time in the relative contribution of the direct 
association between education and attitudes towards migration as well the indirect 
association through economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice. Understanding the 
channels that explain individuals’ attitudes towards migration, particularly following large 
increases in migration flows is crucial if education systems are to be able to adequately 
address concerns native populations may feel because of new arrivals. Finally, we 
examine to what extent differences across countries in the direct and indirect 
associations between education and attitudes towards migration depend on the size of 
the migrant population in a country, recent changes in migrant populations and the 
unemployment rate, an important macroeconomic indicator. 
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2 Theory and hypotheses 
At the individual level, empirical research has documented a strong relationship between 
educational attainment and attitudes towards migration: better educated individuals tend 
to display more openness towards migrants than those with fewer educational 
qualifications (see for example, Gesthuizen, van der Meer and Scheepers 2008; Quillian 
1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 
2006). However, few studies have examined cross-country variations in the relationship 
between education and attitudes towards migration (Quillian 1995; Kunovich 2004 and 
Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002; Borgonovi, 2012; d’Hombres and Nunziata, 
2015 represent important exceptions). Even less is known about why and how education 
matters, in other words what are the underlying social, psychological and cognitive 
processes that determine an association between education and attitudes towards 
migration and if the strength of the association between education and attitudes towards 
migration depends on the conditions and circumstances individuals experience.   
Group threat theory provides a useful framework to identify factors that shape the 
development of attitudes towards migration, how such attitudes may differ depending on 
individuals’ educational attainment, and external conditions such as the size of migrant 
communities and the economic situation of a country. 
Group threat theory predicts that members of a group will exhibit feelings of solidarity 
towards individuals that they consider to be part of their group and negative attitudes 
towards those who do not. Negative attitudes arise from a perceived threat from out-of-
group members to the interest of the group (Blumer, 1958). Group identification and 
perceived threat induced by out-of-group members are conceptually distinct but can be 
mutually reinforcing: strong feelings of identification with a group depend, to a great 
extent, to exposure to out-of-group individuals: “we are what we are because they are 
not what we are” (Tajfel 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979:33). Group threat theory 
essentially maintains that because of the actual or anticipated negative consequences in-
group members suffer (or believe they will suffer) because of out-group members, in-
group members develop explicit preferences for “denying out-of-group members equality 
of treatment that out-of-group members may wish to have” (Allport, 1954, 51). 
Group threat theory predicts that, other things being equal, the more threatened natives 
feel by migrants, the more negative their attitudes towards migrants will be (Blumer 
1958; Case, Greeley and Fuchs 1989; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Scheepers, Gijsberts 
and Coenders 2002; Semyonov, Raijman and Tom-Tov 2002; Semyonov, Raijman and 
Tom-Tov 2004; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Semyonov, Raijman and 
Gorodzeisky 2006).  
Recent empirical findings show how the attitude toward foreigners in host countries 
depends on both economic and non-economic factors. Some authors highlight that 
natives feel threatened by the competition in the labour market that arises from 
immigration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006), while other authors stress the 
importance of non-economic factors, such as racial intolerance and prejudice (Dustmann 
and Preston, 2001), and how both kinds of factors play a significant role (Citrin et al., 
1997; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Dustmann and 
Preston (2007) suggest that welfare concerns play a more important role than labour 
market concerns, and that racial and cultural prejudices relate primarily to immigrants 
from different ethnic backgrounds. 
We consider two types of threat: economic and cultural. Attitudes towards migration may 
be driven by the fear (or lack of fear) of labour-market competition from migrants, what 
is defined in the literature as economic threat. Although the evidence on the net effect of 
immigration on the wages of native populations is mixed, with some studies estimating a 
negative effect of immigration on the wages of competing workers (Borjas; 2003), and 
other studies failing to find adverse effects (D’Amuri et al., 2010; Ottaviano et al.; 2013), 
low educated individuals may perceive migrants as potential substituting them in the 
labour market while better educated individuals may perceive migrants to bring 
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complementarities to their work (d’Hombres and Nunziata, 2015). The literature indeed 
suggests that low-skilled native workers are more likely to support limits to migration 
flows or to hold negative attitudes towards migration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; 
Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006) but also that such effect can only be 
observed among low-skilled natives who are in the labour market.  
Education also fosters individuals’ information processing abilities and, as a result, better 
educated individuals may be better placed to interpret and evaluate migration 
phenomena, enabling them to consider the potential long-term positive economic effects 
that migration can bring to host countries in terms of taxes and social contributions 
which tend to match or even surpass, the amount of individual benefits that they receive 
(Liebig and Mo, 2013). Therefore we hypothesise that individuals who feel economic 
threat will be more opposed to migration but also that better educated individuals will 
perceive lower economic threat and as a result will report more positive attitudes towards 
migration than those who attended school for less.  
Cultural (symbolic) threat characterises the perceived threat native populations feel when 
they enter in contact with out-of-group members because out-of-group members hold 
distinct norms, moral and values from their own (Schnapper, 1994; Fetzer, 2000; 
Stephan, Diaz-Loving and Duran, 2000; Castles and Miller, 2003). Differences in values, 
norms and morals threaten the cultural identity of in-group members because individuals’ 
sense of self and of belonging to a community depends on the articulation of a set of 
common attitudes and values to which all members of the community subscribe. Group 
threat theory predicts that when individuals feel that their culture (defined as the 
organised set of attitudes, values, goals and practices that inform and govern the beliefs 
and behaviours of a group of people or a society), is threatened by the potential 
integration of migrants, they will hold more negative attitudes towards migration.  
Cultural threat depends both on the level of perceived distinctiveness between in-group 
and out-groups in attitudes, morals and values (with greater differences being associated 
with more negative attitudes), individuals’ adherence to a specific and well-defined set of 
values, morals and attitudes (with greater adoption being associated with greater 
perceived threat) and the consideration of such values and morals as universally valid 
(with greater perceived universality being associated with greater perceived threat).  
While highly educated individuals have benefited greatly from globalisation and the 
integration of economies and labour markets, individuals with low levels of education 
have been increasingly been left behind (Autor, 2014). The progressive erosion of social 
status experienced by low educated individuals as a result of globalisation has led to high 
levels of anomie among some but also to an increased adherence to the traditional 
attitudes, values and mores prevalent in their country, and by an increased feeling that 
such attitudes, values and mores are morally justified and should be followed by all 
because they are superior to the attitudes, values and mores prevalent in other societies 
(Sapolsky, 2017). 
Therefore we hypothesise that individuals who feel cultural threat will be more opposed 
to migration but also that better educated individuals will perceive lower cultural threat 
and as a result will report more positive attitudes towards migration than those who 
attended school for less.   
Because group threat theory predicts that attitudes towards migration depend on 
perceived threat, it predicts that, other things being equal, the greater the size of the 
foreign-born population in a country is and the greater the growth in such population 
over time is, the greater the perceived threat will be and, as a result, the more negative 
attitudes towards migrants among native populations will be (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 
1958; Bobo, 1999). However, this prediction holds under equality of conditions. 
Therefore observed differences in attitudes towards migration across countries with 
different levels of migrant populations (or changes in such population over time) may not 
be in line with group threat theory predictions on a negative association between foreign-
born group size and attitudes. A larger group of foreign-born individuals is in fact likely to 
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pose a lower perceived threat in countries and periods characterised by a more 
favourable economic situation and a healthy and dynamic labour market (Semyonov, 
Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2008). Furthermore, intergroup contact theory predicts that as 
the relative size of the foreign-born population increases, members of the two groups will 
have more opportunities for direct contact and, with contact, perceived threat could be 
lower. While initially it was considered that intergroup contact would promote positive 
intergroup attitudes under optimal conditions (such as the presence of common goals, 
intergroup cooperation, equal status and authority support) (Allport, 1954) proponents of 
intergroup contact theory have recently suggested that intergroup contact can promote 
positive intergroup attitudes even when the optimality of conditions situation is not 
satisfied (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008; Stein et al., 2000). 
Empirical studies fail to provide conclusive evidence on the association between the size 
of migrant populations and natives’ attitudes towards migration: some studies indicate 
that larger foreign-born populations are associated with more negative attitudes 
(Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002), 
some fail to find an association (Coenders et al, 2005; Evans and Need, 2002; Strabac 
and Listhaug, 2008) while others find a positive association (Lubbers et al., 2006). We 
examine if individuals’ attitudes towards migrants are associated with the percentage of 
the population who is foreign-born as well as changes in the migrant population. 
Furthermore, we identify if migrant stocks, migrant flows as well as the economic 
situation of a country, as indicated by unemployment rates, moderate the indirect 
association of education on attitudes towards migration through economic threat and 
cultural threat. 
Group threat theory suggests that economic threat and cultural threat may be 
theoretically relevant mediators of the association between education and attitudes 
towards migration. We consider an additional mediator – prejudice – as well as the direct 
association between education and attitudes towards migration in our conceptual 
framework and subsequent empirical analysis.  
Prejudice reflects general negative feelings individuals may hold against people who are 
out-of-group members. Prejudice constitutes a set of socially learned feelings and is 
generally associated with racial or ethnic diversity (Allport 1954; Kinder and Sears 1981; 
Sears and Kinder 1985; Katz 1991). Prejudice is generally defined as a collection of 
negative attitudes ‘toward a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to 
be a member of that group’ (Ashmore 1970, p. 253) or as ‘antipathy based on faulty and 
inflexible generalization’ (Allport 1954, p. 9). Formal education and schooling, given the 
strong emphasis that they have on equipping individuals with information processing 
abilities, should reduce the incidence of prejudice. Contrary to economic or cultural 
threat, prejudice is not rooted into economic or the cultural institutions of a country but, 
rather in irrational generalizations. Therefore, we hypothesise that individuals who have 
prejudicial feelings against migrants will be more opposed to migration and that better 
educated individuals will express lower levels of prejudice and therefore will report more 
positive attitudes towards migration than those who attended school for less. 
Although we expect that most of the association between education and attitudes 
towards migration will be mediated by perceived economic threat, cultural threat and 
prejudice, education may also be directly associated with attitudes towards migration. 
The direct association between education and attitudes towards migration may reflect the 
intergenerational transmission of education and differences in the socialisation processes 
experienced by individuals with highly educated and low educated parents. Children 
internalise from their parents societal norms, attitudes and values (Johnson and Dawes 
2016; Putnam 1993; Stolle and Hooghe 2004; Uslaner 2002) and discuss political and 
social issues with their parents and family members (Dostie-Goulet 2009). There is 
evidence that parents influence young people’s interest in politics, political participation 
and political efficacy (Andolina et al. 2003; Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Dennis 1973; 
Dostie-Goulet 2009; McIntosh et al. 2007). Given past evidence on the positive 
association between education and the likelihood that individuals will hold favourable 
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attitudes towards migration, better educated parents are more likely to socialise their 
children into also holding similarly favourable attitudes, an effect that could be magnified 
by the fact that better educated parents tend to be more engaged with their children and 
to discuss with them social and political issues while they grow and start to form their 
own attitudes and opinions (Borgonovi and Montt, 2012).  
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3 Data and methods 
3.1 European Social Survey  
The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that 
has been mapping attitudes and behavioural changes in Europe’s social, political and 
moral climate since its establishment in 2001. The survey conducts face-to-face 
interviews every two years with newly selected, cross-sectional samples that are 
representative of all persons above the age of 14 and who are resident within private 
households in each country. The sample size requested to participating countries is at 
least 1 500 respondents, although for countries with small populations the number of 
respondents can be smaller. The first round was conducted in 2002 in 22 countries. Since 
then around 350 000 face-to-face interviews have been carried out and over 35 countries 
have participated in at least one ESS round. 
The questionnaire consists of a main core section of questions that have been 
administered in every ESS round and are thus easily comparable over time. These 
questions were developed following the recommendations made by academic experts 
who were consulted by the Core Scientific Team during the early planning stages of the 
ESS. The core modules contain questions aimed at identifying individuals’ attitudes 
towards the media, health and wellbeing, trust in institutions and governments, 
education and occupation, social capital and social trust, household circumstances, citizen 
involvement and democracy, social exclusion, political values and engagement, 
immigration and crime. In addition to questions on attitudes and dispositions, the ESS 
contains information on socio-demographic variables such as respondents’ ethnic and 
immigrant background, household income, level of education, employment and 
occupational status of the respondent, his/ her parents and partner. 
In addition to the ‘core’ modules that are administered in each round, multinational 
teams of researchers based in ESS countries were selected to contribute to the design of 
additional ‘rotating questionnaires’. ‘Rotating questionnaires’ that have been 
administered so far include questions on citizen involvement, health and care, economic 
morality, family, work and wellbeing, timing of life, personal and social wellbeing, welfare 
attitudes, ageism, trust in the police and courts, democracy, immigration, social 
inequalities in health and attitudes to climate change and energy security. Some of these 
topics have been included in more than one ESS round. 
Analyses are based on data from the last three rounds of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), rounds 6, 7 and 8. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with residents aged 15 
or over in 2012 (ESS6), 2014 (ESS7) and 2016 (ESS8) using multistage probability 
sampling. The following 19 countries are part of our analysis: Belgium (BEL), Switzerland 
(CHE), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), 
France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Lithuania 
(LTU), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovenia (SVN) 
and Sweden (SWE).  
Our focus is: 1) to identify between-country differences in the association between 
education and attitudes towards migration and 2) if the education-attitudes link changed 
as a result of the large inflow of new arrivals in European countries that occurred in 2015 
and 2016. Therefore we include in our analysis only individuals who were born in the 
country in which they resided at the time of the ESS interview and who were aged 25 or 
over, and who reported not being engaged in full time education in the 7 days prior to 
the interview. These restrictions lead to a final working sample of 85 917 individuals. 
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3.2 Variable description 
3.2.1 Individual level variables 
Our key outcome indicator, individuals’ opposition to migration, is measured by three 
questions in ESS: 1) 'to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the 
same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?' 2) 'how 
about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country]?' 3) 'how about 
people from the poorer countries in Europe?' Response options were 1 (many), 2 (some), 
3 (a few), and 4 (none). 
We report results on the extent to which individuals report being in favour of allowing 
many, some, a few or no migrants for each of the three categories of migrants identified 
in the European Social Survey (same race or ethnic group, different race or ethnic group, 
poorer countries in Europe). We also construct an indicator of overall opposition to 
migration which represents the sum of individual responses to each of the three 
questions on attitudes to migration and that is subsequently standardised to have a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 across the pooled dataset (pooling countries and 
survey waves). Higher values indicate greater opposition to migration. 
Our key explanatory factors are individuals’ educational attainment, economic threat, 
cultural threat and general prejudice. Each indicator is represented by a single item 
measured on a 10 category scale. Economic threat is measured through responses to the 
question “would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people 
come to live here from other countries?”. Cultural threat is measured through responses 
to the question “would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or 
enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”. General prejudice is 
measured through responses to the question “is [country] made a worse or a better 
place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”. Educational attainment 
was measured through an indicator of the number of years of schooling that the 
respondent reported having attended.  
All models control for age, gender, if the respondent has children, the respondent’s 
subjective financial situation, the respondent’s employment situation and if the 
respondent lives in a big city, in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, in a town or a 
small city, in a country village, farm or in the countryside. 
3.2.2 Country level variables 
At the country level we control for the size of the migrant community in each of the three 
years under analysis (2012, 2014 and 2016). We also control for two-year changes in 
migrant populations (change between 2012 and 2014 for 2014; and change between 
2014 and 2016 for 2016). All data on migrant populations come from OECD migration 
statistics. Finally, we control for the unemployment rate in the year under consideration. 
Unemployment rate data come from the OECD employment database. 
3.2.3 Estimation strategy  
First we develop descriptive statistics on country-level average levels of opposition to 
migration in 2012, 2014 and 2016 and on the percentage of the population who reported 
strong opposition to migration, of being strongly in favour of migration and who reported 
being neither strongly in favour nor strongly against migration. Secondly, we illustrate 
how the overall association between education and opposition to migration changed over 
time both overall and in each of the countries in our sample. Next, we estimate 
differences across countries and across time periods in the direct association between 
years of schooling and attitudes towards migration as well as the importance of indirect 
associations of education through economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice. Finally, 
we explore the extent to which such differences are systematically related to the size of 
migrant communities, changes in migrant communities over time and the unemployment 
rate. 
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We proceed as follows. In a first step we develop simple descriptive statistics on the 
mean levels of the opposition to migration composite index by country and year as well 
as the frequency distribution of the percentage of respondents in each response category 
for each of the three underlying questions to examine country-level differences and 
differences over time in opposition to migration.  
In the second step of the analysis we use path modelling for each of the countries in our 
sample and for each time period to explore if relationships differ across different societies 
and year. Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesised pathways between education and 
attitudes towards migration, which shows both the direct relation between education and 
attitudes towards migration as well indirect relations that are mediated by economic 
threat, cultural threat and prejudice. 
Figure 1. Theoretical mediation model of the association between education and opposition to 
migration 
 
  
We use the Moderated Mediation Framework for assessing mediation and moderation 
(Preacher, Rucker & Hayes 2007; Hayes 2013).  
Figure 2 illustrates the mediation moderation model that we test to identify if education 
not only has a mediated association with attitudes towards migration through economic 
threat, cultural threat and prejudice but also moderates the direct association between 
economic threat and attitudes towards migration, cultural threat and attitudes towards 
migration, and prejudice and attitudes towards migration. We performed the analysis 
country by country and for each time period. 
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Figure 2. Theoretical mediation-moderation model of the association between education and 
opposition to migration 
 
  
 
Since considerable differences across countries emerged, in the third and final step we 
explore cross-country differences as well as differences across the three time periods. 
Figure 3 illustrates the mediation moderation model that we develop to identify the 
country level moderation effects of size of migrant populations and unemployment rate.  
The within part of the analysis described in Figure 3 captures relations at the individual 
level while the between part details relations at the country level. For example, the direct 
relation between individuals’ education and opposition to migration at the within level 
shows the relation between respondents’ educational attainment and their level of 
opposition to migration while the between part of the model describes the relation 
between country mean education and country mean opposition to migration.  
In the modelling phase all individual and country level variables (binary variables 
excluded) were standardised to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the 
pooled dataset so that estimated coefficient can be interpreted in units of SD. Although 
at a first glance it might appear that the multilevel framework for mediation moderation 
analysis would be the most appropriate analytical strategy for our analysis (Preacher, 
Zyphur & Zhang 2010, 2011, 2016), the limited number of groups in our data, namely 
19, combined with the complexity of the underlying model led us to adopt a two-step 
approach. In a first step we estimated model parameters in each country. In the second 
step, country level variables were correlated with estimated parameters. The two step 
approach is recommended in all situations (like the one we face), in which there is a 
large number of observations per unit of analysis and therefore country level parameters 
can be estimated with a high degree of precision (in our case this condition is met 
because we have a large number of respondents per country) (Donald & Lang, 2007; 
Bryan & Jenkins 2015).   
We treated our dependent variable as continuous. Because of the cross-sectional nature 
of ESS data and the modelling strategy that we use, estimates can be used to identify if 
patterns observed are in line with hypothesised relationships and cannot be used to 
prove the causal nature of such relationships. Our results should therefore be used in 
conjunction with studies based on natural experiments, such as the study by (d’Hombres 
and Nunziata, 2016), to support a broad understanding of the role of education can have 
in shaping attitudes towards migration. 
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Figure 3. Theoretical mediation-moderation model of the association between education and 
opposition to migration 
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4 Results 
4.1 Trends in individuals’ opposition to migration in Europe 
Figure 4 reports descriptive statistics on country specific average levels of opposition to 
migration using the composite index in 2012, 2014 and 2016. Higher mean values 
indicate more negative attitudes (stronger opposition to migration). Figure 4 suggests 
that, on average, individuals expressed lower opposition to migration in 2016 than in 
2014 and 2012. On average in 2012 the average level of opposition to migration was 
0.481, in 2014 it was 0.479 and in 2016 it was 0.455. Table 1 indicates that results differ 
across countries analysed: in 7 out of the 19 countries in our sample there was a 
decrease in average levels of opposition to migration between 2012 and 2014 and in 5 
there was an increase. In 8 out of the 19 countries in our sample there was a decrease in 
average levels of opposition to migration between 2014 and 2016 and in 5 out of 19 
there was an increase. 
Figure 4. Levels of opposition to migration in European countries, by country and year (sorted by 
pooled country mean) 
 
 
Note: Countries are ordered in ascending order of the mean level of opposition to migration in the 
pooled dataset calculated over rounds 6, 7 and 8 (years 2012, 2014 and 2016). 
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Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 15 June 2018).   
Table 1. Changes across time in levels of opposition to migration, by country 
Country 
Change 
between 
Country Change 
between 
2012 
2014 
2014 
2016 
2012 
2014 
2014 
2016 
BEL   IRL   
CHE   ISR   
CZE   LTU   
DEU   NLD   
ESP   NOR   
EST   POL   
FIN   PRT   
FRA   SVN   
GBR   SWE   
HUN   Average   
Note:  Statistically significant increase at p>0.05  Statistically significant decrease at p>0.05  
No statistically significant change at p>0.05 
Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018).  
These results are not in line with our expectation of an increase in opposition to 
migration in European countries following the large inflow of arrivals that occurred in 
2015. However, it is possible that the refugee crisis did not induce a generalised increase 
in opposition to migration, but, rather, an increased polarisation in attitudes towards 
migration. Such polarisation may effectively mean that while on average opposition 
decreased, such decrease corresponded to an increase in the share of individuals with 
very negative attitudes that was however more than compensated by an increase in the 
share of individuals with more positive attitudes. An increase in polarisation, if occurring 
within a context of sizable groups in the population who have negative attitudes towards 
migration, may result in a consensus opposing migration.  
Data presented in Figures 5, 6 and 7 indicate that this is not the case and that average 
levels of opposition to migration adequately reflect a general decline in opposition. For 
example, in 2012 on average across the countries in our sample 8% of individuals 
reported that they did not want any migrant from the same ethnic group as the majority 
to be allowed in the country. This figure was around 7% in both 2014 and 2016. By 
contrast 68% of individuals reported that they favoured allowing many or a few in 2012, 
71% of them did so in 2014 and 73% did in 2016. Similarly in 2012 14% individuals 
reported that they favoured that no migrant from a different race or ethnic group as the 
majority settled in their country, 13% reported the same in 2014 and 14% in 2016. 
Support for allowing many or some migrants from a different race or ethnic background 
as the majority remained stable from 55% in 2012 to 56% in 2014 and 55% in 2016. 
Unlike the average trend, results show that in certain countries opposition to migration 
grew. Mirroring results illustrated in Figure 4 based on the composite index, Figures 5, 6 
and 7 indicate increasing levels of opposition in the Czech Republic. For example, the 
percentage of individuals who indicated that they would not allow any migrant as the 
same group as the majority increased from 17% in 2012 to 18% in 2014 and 21% in 
2016. Similarly, the percentage of individuals who indicated that they would not allow 
any migrant from a different race or ethnic group from the majority increased from 24% 
in 2012 to 30% in 2014 and 37% in 2016. In Hungary opposition also grew greatly over 
the period: 28% indicated that they would not allow any migrant from a different race or 
ethnic group from the majority in 2012, 33% reported so in 2014 and 47% reported the 
same in 2016. By contrast, in a country like Finland 7% of the population in 2012 
reported that they would not allow any migrant from a different race or ethnic group 
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from the majority, 8% did so in 2014 and 6% reported the same in 2016. In Portugal, 
16% opposed allowing any migrant from a different race or ethnic background in 2012, 
while 9% in 2014 and 10% in 2016 reported the same. 
Figure 5. Support for migration of individuals from the same race/ethnic group as the majority, by 
country and year 
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Figure 6. Support for migration of individuals from a different race/ethnic group as the majority, 
by country and year 
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Figure 7. Support for migration of individuals from poorer countries outside of Europe, by country 
and year 
 
Notes: Countries are reported in alphabetical order. The percentages reported in the left panel of the 
figure represent the sum of respondents who report “allow many” and “allow some”. The percentages 
reported in the right panel of the figure represent the sum of respondents who report “allow a few” 
and “allow none”. Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018).  
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Figures 8, 9 and 10 illustrate, for each year under analysis, country level associations 
between average levels of opposition to migration and three key contextual variables: 
the size of the migrant population and the unemployment rate (see Table A1 for details 
on correlations between country level variables depicted in the scatterplots and 
associated statistical significance). Contrary to group threat theory, results indicate that 
there is no significant association between overall levels of opposition to migration and 
the level of threat that individuals may perceive as a result of the size of the migrant 
community and the precariousness of the labour market. By contrast, results suggest 
that the increase in countries with the most pronounces increase in the share of foreign-
born populations between 2014 and 2016 has the lowest mean levels of opposition to 
migration in 2016 (see Table A.1 in Annex A). We turn to examining the extent to which 
such factors contribute to a polarisation across levels of education in attitudes in the next 
section. 
Figure 8. Country level associations between opposition to migration and share of the population 
who is foreign-born, by year  
  
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who is foreign born. The y axis 
represents the mean value of the opposition to migration index.  
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018) "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
 
Figure 1. Country level associations between opposition to migration and unemployment rate, by 
year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who is foreign born. The y axis 
represents the mean value of the opposition to migration index.  
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018) "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
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Figure 2. Country level associations between opposition to migration and changes in the share of 
migrant populations 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who is foreign born. The y axis 
represents the mean value of the opposition to migration index.  
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018) "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
 
 
4.2 The role of education in shaping attitudes towards migration 
Figure 11 illustrates the association between education and opposition to migration for 
each of the countries in our sample and for each of the three years under consideration: 
2012, 2014 and 2016. Results illustrate a high degree of heterogeneity across countries 
in the association between education and opposition to migration and in how such 
association changed over the period considered. On average and other things being 
equal, individuals who attended formal education for longer reported lower levels of 
opposition to migration with no major differences in estimated associations between 
2012, 2014 and 2016. The average education gradient in individuals’ opposition to 
migration was 0.213 in 2012, -0.236 in 2014 and -0.214 in 2016. Since both education 
and attitudes towards migration were standardised to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1 over the pooled sample, this means that a difference of 3.9 years of 
schooling (which correspond to the standard deviation in the education measure), is 
associated with between 21% and 24% of a standard deviation difference in opposition 
to migration and that the association is negative: more schooling is associated with lower 
opposition to migration. 
Slovenia is a country where the education gradient is very large in comparative terms: it 
was -0.312 in 2012, -0.394 in 2014 and -0.333 in 2016. By contrast in Lithuania the 
education gradient is comparatively small and changed greatly over the period 
considered. In 2012 the education gradient in 2012 was very small (-0.006): essentially 
there was no difference in the attitudes towards migration of individuals with different 
levels of education. The gradient became negative, indicating that opposition was greater 
among the less educated in 2014 (education gradient equal to -0.173) and in 2016 
(education gradient equal to -0.138). In Germany the education gradient was 
comparatively large in 2012 and 2014 (-0.265 in 2012 and -0.305 in 2014), while it 
became smaller in 2016 (-0.200), signalling that in Germany differences in levels of 
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opposition to migration within the population were more tightly associated with 
educational participation in 2012 and 2014 than in 2016. 
Overall, results presented in Figure 11 and Table 2 suggest that between 2014 and 2016, 
a period with generally stable or decreasing level of self-reported opposition to migration 
in many countries as established in the previous section, education became a less 
important demographic factor in predicting opposition to migration in 9 countries, it 
became more important in 3 countries and it remained stable in the remaining 6 
countries. 
Figure 11. The overall association between years of schooling and opposition to migration, by 
country and year (sorted by pooled country mean) 
 
 
Note: Countries are ranked in descending order of the overall association between years of schooling 
and opposition to migration calculated on a pooled database over ESS rounds 6, 7 and 8.  
Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018). 
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Table 2. Changes across time in the association between education and opposition to migration 
 
Country Change 
between 
Country Change 
between 
2012 
2014 
2014 
2016 
2012 
2014 
2014 
2016 
BEL   IRL   
CHE   ISR   
CZE   LTU   
DEU   NLD   
ESP   NOR   
EST   POL   
FIN   PRT   
FRA   SVN   
GBR   SWE   
HUN   Average   
Note:  Significantly more negative (more polarisation) at p>0.05  significant less negative (less 
polarisation) at p>0.05  no statistically significant change at p>0.05. 
Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018). 
 
Figure 12 illustrates for each year, the country-level association between average levels 
of opposition to migration and the education gradient in levels of opposition to migration. 
The education gradient is defined as the difference in opposition to migration between 
individuals who differ by one standard deviation in educational attainment (corresponding 
to 3.9 years of schooling). The more negative the education gradient is, the less opposed 
to immigration better educated individuals are compared to individuals with lower levels 
of educational participation. The more positive the opposition to migration index is, the 
more opposed to migration (on average) individuals in a country are. Table A1 in the 
Annex report correlations between country level variables and associated levels of 
significance.  
Results suggest that there is no association between how opposed individuals in a 
country are to migration and the polarisation of such opposition between individuals with 
different levels of education. Countries like Norway have a small education gradient and 
comparatively favourable attitudes towards migrants (meaning that both the highly and 
poorly education have similarly favourable attitudes towards migration), while others like 
the Czech Republic have a small education gradient and comparatively unfavourable 
attitudes towards migrants (meaning that both the highly and poorly education similarly 
oppose migration), Slovenia has a large education gradient and comparatively 
unfavourable attitudes towards migrants (meaning that average levels of unfavourable 
attitudes towards migration are accompanied by a large polarisation of attitudes with 
highly educated individuals reporting considerably more favourable attitudes than low 
educated individuals), while Germany in 2014 has a large education gradient and 
comparatively favourable attitudes towards migrants (meaning that average levels of 
favourable attitudes towards migration are accompanied by a large polarisation of 
attitudes with highly educated individuals reporting considerably more favourable 
attitudes than low educated individuals). 
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Figure 3. Country level associations between opposition to migration and education gradients in 
attitudes towards migration, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the overall association between years of schooling and opposition to 
migration, the y axis represents mean levels of opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018). 
 
Figure 13 illustrates for each year the country level association between the education 
gradient in levels of opposition to migration and the share of the population who was 
foreign-born. Results suggest that there is no association between how different the 
attitudes towards migration of highly educated and low educated individuals are and the 
overall size of the migrant community. Similarly, Figures 14 and 15 show that there is no 
association between the education gradient in levels of opposition to migration and the 
unemployment rate and between the education gradient in levels of opposition to 
migration and recent changes in migrant populations. This means that there is no 
evidence, for the years under study, that attitudes towards migration are more polarised 
along levels of education in countries with larger migrant populations, countries with high 
levels of unemployment or countries with large inflows of migrants in recent years 
(rather than in countries with smaller migrant populations, lower unemployment and 
smaller inflows of new arrivals).  
Figure 4. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
and the share of migrant populations, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who was foreign born, the y axis 
represents the overall association between years of schooling and opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018) "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
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Figure 5. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
and unemployment rate, by year 
Notes: The x axis represents the unemployment rate, the y axis represents the overall association 
between years of schooling and opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
Figure 6. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
and changes in the share of migrant populations, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the overall association between years of schooling and opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
Figure 16 suggests that in countries where the share of the migrant population grew the 
most between 2014 and 2016, the education gradient did not change. This stands in 
marked contrast to the change that occurred between 2012 and 2014 when countries 
that experienced the largest increases in foreign-born populations were the countries 
where the education gradient in opposition to migration became more pronounced (see 
Table A.1). 
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Figure 7. Changes in education gradients as a function of changes in the share of migrant 
populations between 2012 and 2014 and between 2014 and 2016 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the change in the overall association between years of schooling and opposition 
to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
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4.3 Differences across countries and changes over time in the 
direct and indirect associations between education and 
attitudes towards migration  
 
Figure 8 illustrates differences across countries and over time in the overall association 
between education and opposition to migration but cannot be used to identify the 
mechanisms underlying such association. Figure 17 displays results based on data from 
the pooled sample of participants in the last three rounds of the European Social Survey 
to identify mechanisms underlying the association between education and opposition to 
migration. By pooling survey waves and countries together we effectively make the 
strong assumption that associations do not vary across countries and over time. We relax 
this assumption in Figure 18, where we estimate country specific and time specific 
models to illustrate differences across countries and over time in the relative importance 
of the direct association between education and opposition to migration as well as the 
importance of the indirect channels of economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice.  
Results presented in Figure 17 indicate that, as expected, the association between 
education and individuals’ sense of economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice is 
negative: those who attended school for longer report lower levels of threat and 
prejudice. Also in line with our hypotheses, the association between opposition to 
migration and economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice is positive: individuals 
report greater opposition to migration when they believe that migration is bad for the 
economy, for the cultural life of the country or that the country is made a worse place 
because of international migrants. Crucially, our study reveals that more than 75% of the 
total association between education and opposition to migration is indirect and can be 
attributed to the lower perceived economic, cultural threat and the lower prejudice 
experienced by individuals who attended school for longer. In particular, Figure 17 
suggests that, in the pooled sample, the relative contribution of each of the three indirect 
mechanisms – economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice – and the direct mechanism 
is very similar. We examine differences across countries and over time next. 
Figure 17. Estimated relationships between education and opposition to migration, pooled sample 
of ESS countries for rounds 6, 7 and 8) 
 
 
Figure 18 summarises findings from the country specific and year specific path models 
that are represented in Figure 1. It depicts the variation across countries and over time 
of the decomposition of the total association between education and opposition to 
Opposition to 
migration
General 
prejudice
Economic 
threat
Cultural
threat
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Controls
-0.27** 
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-0.07** 
(-0.07**) 
Note: ** p < .001; indirect effects in brackets
(-0.05**) 
(-0.05**)
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migration into direct and indirect relationships through economic threat, cultural threat 
and prejudice. Results suggest that on average the proportion of the total association 
between education and opposition to migration that was mediated through cultural threat 
and prejudice remained stable between 2012 and 2016. By contrast, the mediated 
association through economic threat decreased between 2012 and 2014 (from 32% of 
the overall association in 2012 to 25% in 2014 and 26% in 2016) while the direct 
association grew over the same period (from 22% in 2012 to 33% in 2014 and 30% in 
2016).  
The relative importance of the direct association between education and opposition to 
migration grew between 2014 and 2016 in seven countries (Czech Republic, Finland, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia) while it decreased in Belgium, 
Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden). In most of 
these countries the relative growth or decline in the relative importance of the direct 
association was compensated by a similar increase or decrease in the importance of the 
mediated relationship through economic threat. For example, in Switzerland, the relative 
importance of the direct association changed from 33% in 2014 to 7% in 2016, while the 
relative importance of the mediated association through economic threat changed from 
21% in 2014 to 31% in 2016.  
In most countries, the mediated association through prejudice remained stable over the 
period. Noteworthy exceptions are: 
● a first group of countries where the relative importance of the mediated 
association through prejudice decreased between 2012 and 2014 and then 
remained stable (this group includes the Czech Republic, where the indirect 
association through prejudice was 33% in 2012 but 12% in 2014 and 10% in 
2016; Finland, where the indirect association through prejudice was 35% in 2012 
but 17% in 2014 and 18% in 2016; Hungary, where the indirect association 
through prejudice was 20% in 2012 but only 10% in 2014 and 11% in 2016);  
● a second group of countries where the indirect association through prejudice 
decreased between 2012 and 2014 but then increased between 2014 and 2016 
(for example Belgium, where the indirect association through prejudice was 38% 
in 2012, 23% in 2014 and 34% in 2016; Poland, where the indirect association 
through prejudice was 55% in 2012, 20% in 2014 and 32% in 2016);  
● a third group of countries where the indirect association through prejudice 
increased between 2012 and 2016 (for example Norway, where the indirect 
association through prejudice was 27% in 2012, 34% in 2014 and 41% in 2016). 
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Figure 18. Estimated direct and indirect relationships between education and opposition to 
migration, by country and year (sorted by pooled country mean) 
 
 
Note: Countries are ranked in descending order of the overall association between education and 
attitudes towards migration in the pooled dataset over rounds 6, 7 and 8.  
Source: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018). 
 
We estimated a mediation moderation model to test if the associations between 
economic threat and opposition to migration, cultural threat and opposition to migration, 
and prejudice and opposition to migration, differ across individuals with different levels of 
education. Findings suggest that education is not an important moderator of such 
associations; while individuals who attended formal education for longer tend to report 
experiencing lower economic threat, lower cultural threat and lower prejudice than 
individuals who attended formal education for a shorter period, both groups tend to form 
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similar levels of opposition to migration in response to similar feelings of threat or 
prejudice (results available from the authors upon request). 
4.4 The importance of size of migrant populations and 
unemployment rates as moderators of the direct and indirect 
association between education and attitudes towards 
migration 
 
Figures 19 and 20 map the extent to which the direct association between education and 
attitudes towards migration differ depending on the size of the migrant community in a 
country or the unemployment rate. Results suggest that there is no association between 
the strength of the direct association between education and attitudes towards migration 
in a country, and the share of migrants present in that country (correlations are 
quantitatively close to 0 and statistically not significant). Similarly, the association 
between the strength of the direct association between education and attitudes towards 
migration and the unemployment rate is not statistically significant in any of the years 
under consideration; and the only year for which the correlation is quantitatively 
meaningful and in the expected direction is 2014.  
Figure 8. Country level associations between direct education gradients in attitudes towards 
migration and share of the population who is foreign-born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who was foreign born, the y axis 
represents the direct association between years of schooling and opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
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Figure 9. Country level associations between direct education gradients in attitudes towards 
migration and unemployment rate, by year 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the direct association between years of schooling and opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  
"Labour: Labour market statistics" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00046-en) (accessed on 2 July 
2018). 
 
Figure 10. Country level associations between direct education gradients in attitudes towards 
migration and changes in the share of the population who is foreign-born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the direct association between years of schooling and opposition to migration. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
 
The final step of our analysis examines the extent to which the mediated association 
between education and opposition to migration through economic threat, cultural threat 
and prejudice depends on the size of migrant populations, changes in migrant 
populations and unemployment rates.  
Figures 22, 23 and 24 plot each of the three indirect associations and the share of the 
overall population in a country who is foreign born, Figures 25, 26 and 27 plot each of 
the three indirect associations and the unemployment rate and Figures 28, 29 and 30 
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plot each of the three indirect associations and the change in the share of the overall 
population in a country who is foreign born.  
Results reveal that there is no association between the share (and changes in) of the 
population who is foreign born, unemployment rates in a country and the extent to which 
individuals with different levels of education in such country oppose migration because of 
feelings of economic threat. Similarly, there is no association between the share (and 
changes in) of the population who is foreign born, unemployment rates in a country and 
the extent to which individuals with different levels of education in such country oppose 
migration because of prejudice (the only statistically significant association is between 
the mediated association through prejudice and the share of the population who is 
foreign-born in 2012, see Table A.1). 
 
Figure 11. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through economic threat and share of the population who is foreign-born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who was foreign born, the y axis 
represents the association between years of schooling and opposition to migration mediated through 
economic threat. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
Figure 12. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through prejudice and share of the population who is foreign-born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who was foreign born, the y axis 
represents the association between years of schooling and opposition to migration mediated through 
general prejudice. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
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Figure 13. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through cultural threat and share of the population who is foreign-born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the proportion of the population who was foreign born, the y axis 
represents the association between years of schooling and opposition to migration mediated through 
cultural threat. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
 
Figure 14. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through economic threat and unemployment rate, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the unemployment rate, the y axis represents the association between 
years of schooling mediated through economic threat. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  
"Labour: Labour market statistics" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00046-en) (accessed on 2 July 
2018). 
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Figure 15. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through prejudice and unemployment rate, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the unemployment rate, the y axis represents the association between 
years of schooling mediated through general prejudice. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  
"Labour: Labour market statistics" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00046-en) (accessed on 2 July 
2018  
Figure 16. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through cultural threat and unemployment rate, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the unemployment rate, the y axis represents the association between 
years of schooling mediated through cultural threat. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  
"Labour: Labour market statistics" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00046-en) (accessed on 2 July 
2018  
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Figure 17.Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through economic threat and the share of the population who is foreign born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the association between years of schooling and opposition to migration 
mediated through economic threat. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
 
Figure 18. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through prejudice and the share of the population who is foreign born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the association between years of schooling and opposition to migration 
mediated through general prejudice. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018). 
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Figure 19. Country level associations between education gradients in attitudes towards migration 
mediated through cultural threat and the share of the population who is foreign born, by year 
 
Notes: The x axis represents the change in the proportion of the population who was foreign born, 
the y axis represents the association between years of schooling and opposition to migration 
mediated through cultural threat. 
Only countries with information on both variables have been included. 
Sources: Adapted from European Social Survey database, rounds 6, 7 and 8 
(https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) (accessed 01 June 2018) and (OECD, 2018)  "International 
migration database" (https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00342-en) (accessed on 2 July 2018 
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5 Discussion 
 
Education is often considered an important element to foster openness to diversity and 
ensure that individuals do not perceive migration phenomena as a threat but, rather, 
hold positive attitudes towards migration. However, much less is known about the 
mechanisms that facilitate education’s role in promoting favourable attitudes towards 
migration and, in particular, how individuals with different levels of education react to 
changes in their economic and social environment.  
We examined data from the last three waves of the European Social Survey to identify 
the changing association between education and attitudes towards migration in European 
countries between 2012 and 2016, a period of rapid changes in the economic and social 
landscape in Europe. In particular, in 2015 a very large number of refugees and asylum 
seekers fleeing conflict entered Europe at a time when many European societies were 
just emerging from the protracted economic crisis that followed the collapse of financial 
institutions in 2008.  
Perhaps surprisingly, our results reveal that in many countries opposition to migration 
decreased over the period, although we observe a large degree of heterogeneity across 
countries in levels of opposition to migration and how opposition to migration changed 
over the period. The largest decrease in opposition to migration occurred in Great Britain, 
Portugal and Israel. By contrast, in Spain, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic opposition to migration significantly increased over the period.  
The fact that individuals’ attitudes towards migration did not change in the majority of 
countries, and in some became more positive between 2014 and 2016, may be driven by 
the fact that new arrivals were often humanitarian migrants seeking asylum, and 
therefore host population may have felt a moral and ethical responsibility to support 
them, on top of any legal responsibility their country may have had because of 
international law on humanitarian protection. The literature suggests that individuals 
distinguish between different migrant groups when modulating feelings of opposition to 
migration. For example, in the United Kingdom individuals express opposition to 
migration when asked about migrants overall, but much more positive attitudes when 
they are asked about specific groups of migrants (Ford, Morrell and Heath, 2012). In 
particular, individuals appear to hold more positive attitudes towards refugees than other 
groups of migrants (Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Hatton, 2016) 
Our analyses suggest that in the short term opposition to migration did not increase. 
However, to the extent that countries struggled with protracted difficulties related to 
integrating migrants in education and training systems, health systems and labour 
markets, public attitudes may shift in the medium term. Furthermore, the short-term 
changes in attitudes observed in our analysis may not be generalizable to other potential 
future changes in migration stocks and flows since the specific composition of the large 
influx registered in 2015 may have determined changes in public attitudes towards 
migrants.  
The main aim of the paper was to examine how the association between education and 
attitudes towards migration changed between 2014 and 2016 and to compare such 
change to previous trends, using 2012 as a benchmark. In some countries, such as 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Portugal Slovenia and Sweden, the association became 
considerably weaker and led to a lower polarisation of attitudes between individuals with 
high and low education amidst overall more favourable attitudes towards migration. In 
others, like Belgium, Lithuania and Norway, the association between education and 
opposition to migration became stronger inducing a deepening polarisation in attitudes 
between individuals with high and low education at a time of growing overall opposition 
to migration. We find that there is no association at the country level between the level 
of polarisation in attitudes towards migration across individuals with different levels of 
education and the size of foreign born populations or unemployment rates. We also find 
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that the increase in migrant populations between 2014 and 2016 corresponded to lower 
levels of polarisation by level of education and no comparable change in overall levels of 
opposition to migration.  
Our results are consistent with theories that consider education as an important 
determinant of attitudes towards migration because of the influence it has on feelings of 
economic threat, cultural threat and prejudice that individuals experience in response to 
the presence of foreign-born individuals. These three mediators account for around 
three-quarters, on average, of the overall association between education and opposition 
to migration.  
In general, the share of the population who is foreign born, recent changes in this share 
and the unemployment rate in the country do not appear to be important moderators of 
the direct and indirect association between education and attitudes towards migration.  
The finding that there is a marked difference in the extent to which individuals with high 
and low education report being opposed to migration phenomena suggests that although 
what happens in classrooms can play a positive role in strengthening social cohesion in 
the presence of foreign-born populations by equipping individuals with skills and cultural 
awareness, disparities in educational opportunities and attainment can create highly 
polarised public opinions on topics of increasing social and political relevance. While the 
importance of economic threat in shaping differences in opposition to migration across 
individuals with different levels of education is well recognised, our analysis shows that 
cultural threat and prejudice are equally important channels and, taken together, explain 
almost twice the variation in opposition to migration by education group than economic 
threat.  
The fact that individuals with greater educational attainment experience lower prejudice 
and lower cultural threat suggests that even if individuals can be open to the social and 
cultural diversity that results from migration flows, at the moment formal education is 
the primary channel that helps develop the cognitive capacity, emotional dispositions and 
psychological states that are necessary to not feel threatened by the presence of foreign-
born populations. The political and social significance of this finding cannot be 
underestimated since, unless remedied, a profound cultural gap between social classes is 
likely to emerge.  
Moving forward, it is of paramount importance that education and schooling will equip all 
individuals, not only those who obtain higher level qualifications, with the ability to either 
not feel threatened by the culture of new arrivals or with the ability to respond positively 
to feelings of threat such that they do not lead individuals to hold discriminatory views 
and attitudes. Potential actions include fostering global competencies early on in the 
school years to ensure that all individuals, irrespective of their eventual highest 
educational attainment, will develop similar levels of the foundation skills that are 
necessary to be open and understand different cultures and traditions. Education systems 
in many countries are increasingly aiming to foster global competence in their students, 
enabling them to appreciate different perspectives and world views, and interact 
successfully and respectfully with others (OECD, 2018). In order to ensure that older 
cohorts are not left behind, the development of lifelong learning programs could be 
developed in order to help older cohorts with the knowledge and skills that are necessary 
to be able to understand multicultural issues and deal with the tensions they create in 
everyday life.  
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Annex A Country level correlations 
Table A1. Full sample correlations and bootstrap correlations of variables depicted in the 
text with corresponding p-values 
  
2012 2014 2016 
  
sample bootstrap sample bootstrap sample bootstrap 
Fig. 8 Corr. -0.162 -0.162 -0.332 -0.332 -0.365 -0.365 
 
p-val. 0.520 0.506 0.247 0.171 0.181 0.183 
Fig. 9 Corr. 0.268 0.268 0.152 0.152 0.036 0.036 
 
p-val. 0.283 0.164 0.548 0.478 0.888 0.869 
Fig. 12 Corr. -0.058 0.815 0.172 0.172 0.164 0.502 
 
p-val. 0.815 0.751 0.482 0.345 0.502 0.454 
Fig. 13 Corr. 0.067 0.067 0.008 0.008 -0.028 -0.028 
 
p-val. 0.821 0.832 0.977 0.221 0.920 0.918 
Fig. 14 Corr. 0.010 0.010 0.027 0.027 0.046 0.046 
 
p-val. 0.968 0.968 0.914 0.925 0.856 0.869 
Fig. 19 Corr. 0.040 0.040 0.090 0.090 0.340 0.340 
 
p-val. 0.875 0.868 0.759 0.778 0.215 0.067 
Fig. 20 Corr. -0.142 -0.142 -0.124 -0.124 -0.066 -0.066 
 
p-val. 0.574 0.599 0.625 0.682 0.794 0.721 
Fig. 22 Corr. 0.141 0.140 0.150 0.150 0.045 0.045 
 
p-val. 0.578 0.283 0.609 0.400 0.875 0.868 
Fig. 23 Corr. -0.361 -0.360 0.055 0.055 -0.238 -0.238 
 
p-val. 0.142 0.007 0.853 0.853 0.392 0.367 
Fig. 24 Corr. -0.191 -0.191 -0.450 -0.450 -0.407 -0.407 
 
p-val. 0.448 0.158 0.106 0.105 0.132 0.194 
Fig. 25 Corr. -0.171 -0.171 0.174 0.174 -0.130 -0.130 
 
p-val. 0.499 0.378 0.489 0.357 0.607 0.549 
Fig. 26 Corr. 0.098 0.098 -0.086 -0.086 -0.184 -0.184 
 
p-val. 0.700 0.610 0.735 0.601 0.466 0.320 
Fig. 27 Corr. 0.361 0.361 0.224 0.224 0.198 0.198 
 
p-val. 0.141 0.024 0.372 0.244 0.431 0.403 
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2014-2012 2016-2014 
  
  
sample bootstrap sample bootstrap 
  
Fig. 10 Corr. -0.240 -0.240 -0.444 -0.444 
  
 
p-val. 0.409 0.152 0.112 0.043 
  
Fig. 15 Corr. -0.214 -0.214 -0.121 -0.121 
  
 
p-val. 0.463 0.444 0.681 0.735 
  
Fig. 16 Corr. -0.851 -0.851 0.139 0.139 
  
 
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.637 0.611 
  
Fig. 21 Corr. 0.192 0.192 0.443 0.443 
  
 
p-val. 0.531 0.406 0.130 0.075 
  
Fig. 28 Corr. -0.232 -0.232 -0.065 -0.065 
  
 
p-val. 0.425 0.382 0.825 0.862 
  
Fig. 29 Corr. -0.471 -0.471 -0.462 -0.462 
  
 
p-val. 0.089 0.023 0.096 0.060 
  
Fig. 30 Corr. -0.420 -0.419 -0.191 -0.191 
  
 
p-val. 0.135 0.089 0.513 0.380 
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